With the rapid development of Internet of Things (IoT) applications, heterogeneous device management issues tend to arise in architecture security due to hardware computing power, types of software, data transmission interfaces, and networking protocols. Even during data exchange between devices and systems, traditional IoT devices are prone to the disclosure of personal information, which compromises privacy. Thus, planning an effective information security management strategy has become an essential part of application development. This paper presents a strategy to achieve information security verification and risk assessment for an IoT-based personal health information system. Using several interfaces of IoT devices, including Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, we simulate possible attack hypotheses and define test methods and evaluation methods suitable for each device. In our application systems for information security analysis, we also consider and integrate weaknesses of the system architecture to achieve a more complete information security threat analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is the concept of connecting devices to the Internet and each other to provide services. In recent years, the Internet of things has been regarded as a new technology with a significant influence on big data analysis and artificial intelligence [1] , [2] . In medical services [3] , [4] , the IoT can assist the development of personal health care. For example, personal health care uses the application model of wearable devices to help process biological characteristics and ensure early detection and monitoring of some diseases [5] . Personal privacy information is a considerable challenge for the IoT [6] - [8] . Due to environment and hardware, most IoT devices have resource limitations. With insufficient computing power, information security protection mechanisms for data and transmission processes are abandoned to achieve efficiency. On the issue of device heterogeneity, it is difficult to achieve hardware efficiency in managing devices and integrating systems. There are many security vulnerabilities [9] - [13] and cyber threats, such as the infamous Mirai malware [14] . After infection by Mirai
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Young Jin Chun . malware, the device continues to scan the IoT for Internet devices' IP addresses and uses the default username and password to login to these devices. While the infected device will continue to work, it becomes a member of the Mirai botnet.
II. RELATED WORK
In the literature on wearable devices of the IoT, many studies have focused on the issue of personal information disclosure [15] , [16] . Testing methods used include port scanning, security vulnerability scanning, and vulnerability exploitation with well-known tools such as Nmap [17] , Nessus [18] , OpenVAS [19] , Wireshark [20] and Burp Suite [21] . Based on differences in networking modes and capabilities, IoT devices, may be classified into two transmission modes-Wi-Fi and Bluetooth-which are implemented using different protocols. In the relevant researches on Bluetooth security, the attack dimension of each study can be classified as either a direct attack of hardware RAM [22] , packet collection of network transmission packets [23] , firmware cracking [24] , or an App cracking attack of a Bluetooth device [25] .
After obtaining the results of an information security vulnerabilities test, we enter the risk assessment stage. According to IoT risk assessment research [6] , [26] , the method of risk assessment can be classified as either quantitative evaluation or qualitative evaluation. Quantitative evaluation uses historical statistical data for analysis. Qualitative evaluation uses analysis to identify the probability of risk occurrence and analyze the impact of risk occurrence on the target, as well as other factors. Here, we can adopt methods such as the STRIDE model [27] and the DREAD model [28] , [29] . In the STRIDE model-based risk assessment studies, either the DREAD model is used to calculate the risk ratio, a Data Flow Diagram (DFD) [30] is used to analyze more subtle risks, a custom risk assessment model is used [31] - [35] , or risk analysis and protective measures are developed in the form of clauses.
III. USE CASE: PERSONAL HEALTH DATA COLLECTION SYSTEM
The platform aims to assess the user's potential environmental risk factors and offer healthy lifestyle recommendations. Medical service providers can also use the case management provided by the platform to accurately grasp the case situation and treatment. To achieve the goal of personalized medicine, the framework uses IoT devices, such as mobile phones, smartwatches, and environmental monitoring devices, to monitor the lifestyles and home environments of patients outside of hospitals. It can collect data on lifestyle, household environment, and public environmental information from publicly-available government data.
A. THE IoT SYSTEM INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK
The healthy lifestyle application, as shown in Figure 1 , can capture the user's current mobile phone location (using background procedures and sensor information) and immediately send this location to the server. When the user returns home, he or she can also examine the average air quality the user has been exposed to during the day.
Regarding data collection, the main functions of the healthy life app are: (1) to examine the user's home and local environmental data such as PM2.5, PM10, CO 2 , CO, temperature, and humidity; (2) to collect lifestyle information, such as sleep quality, activity, heart rate, blood pressure, and vital signs; and (3) to collect publicly-available government environmental information, such as ultraviolet, air quality, and weather conditions. The platform is used by case managers and doctors. In the case of care, specific wearable devices are needed, and airboxes are installed in the home. The platform provides immediate access to external environmental data, internal environmental data (such as temperature, humidity, PM2.5, and PM10) using IoT sensors, and personal health information (activities, calories burned, heart rate, blood pressure, and blood oxygen) through a public third-party API. The data transmission process is transmitted by the HTTPS protocol to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the data. All data are synchronized to the database every five minutes. The platform implements access control for patient privacy.
B. WORKFLOW
We use five workflows to illustrate examples of use cases: user registration, data query, management platform, sensor data collection, and open data collection.
1) USER REGISTRATION
The user registration workflow consists of four steps: (a) the user uses a web browser to access third-party websites in a medical application; (b) after registering with the thirdparty server, the user logs in with a username and password, which calls back the authentication token to the central API server using OAuth2.0; (c) when the central API server receives a response authentication token, the token is sent to the database to be saved; and (d) the medical application is updated during the user's launch of the application service on the phone.
2) DATA QUERY
The data query workflow consists of four steps: (a) the medical app requests an authentication token and metadata from the central API server; (b) if the central API server does not have the user's data, it will reply to the third-party website that the user needs to log in; (c) if the central API server has the user data, it will respond to the authentication token; and (d) medical applications use authentication tokens to obtain personal health data from the third-party API.
3) MANAGEMENT PLATFORM
The management platform workflow consists of four steps: (a) the user registers an account on the management platform; (b) when logging in to the portal, the user is authenticated according to the permissions of his or her role; (c) the user is required to enter the patient's identity information, and the request is sent to the web server; and (d) the web server retrieves relevant metadata and sends the data to the central API server, requesting that personal health data be sent to the database.
4) SENSOR DATA COLLECTION
The sensor data collection workflow consists of three steps: (a) the sensor acquires data and sends it to the app via Bluetooth; (b) after the third-party obtains the new data, a notification is sent to the central API; and (c) the central API server requests new data using the user's authentication token, and then sends the data to the database.
5) OPEN DATA COLLECTION
The open data collection workflow consists of one step: (a) the scheduling service requests the open data API and retrieves the data to be stored in the database.
IV. THREAT MODELING
To create a threat model for this application, we define a security motivation that includes security basics such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability. We then create an application overview to understand the functionality of the application, which involves (1) identifying data for application sources and targets, (2) understanding the purpose of the application, and (3) analyzing the function of the application.
The application can be divided into levels that define external entities, trust boundaries, data flows, and entry points, with areas of vulnerability between them. It can also help with attack surface analysis. The following activities help decompose the application: (1) enumerate external dependencies, (2) list the entry points, (3) determine the components, (4) specify the trust level, and (5) draw a data flow chart. External dependencies define the application's dependencies on external entities such as servers, firewalls, security policies, operating systems, networks, and so on. Although these entities are beyond the control of the application, they are still within the control of the organization. Identifying these external dependencies may help minimize the overall risk to the application. An entry point is an interface where a user enters data or interacts with an application. Potential attackers can use these entry points to attack applications. Applications can have multiple entry points; for example, external entries are exposed to internal entry points that are exposed to subcomponents across the application layer. Attackers can bypass the first level of the entry point to directly attack the internal entry point. Typical entry points include login and authentication, management interfaces, query and search capabilities, transaction interfaces (such as APIs), and business workflows. An application's assets are of value to the attacker. They are important targets of a threat and one reason why applications are at risk of attack. It is critical to identify all assets in the application that need to be protected against unauthorized access.
The trust level defines the access that an application should grant to external entities. We define possible roles, including a set of privileges and trust levels assigned to roles. Figure 2 illustrates how we analyze system architecture security from an information security perspective to achieve superior risk identification, risk analysis, risk assessment, and improvement measures. After security requirements are identified, the application's security design becomes simpler. Security design principles are practices or guidelines that developers follow during the development phase. Threat modeling is the process of identifying, analyzing, and mitigating application threats. It is a structured approach that allows developers to assess threats based on the application's architecture and implementation, executed during the design phase of the security development lifecycle. Threat modeling is an iterative process, starting with the design phase of the application and iterating through the application lifecycle until all possible threats to the application are identified. The output of threat modeling is a threat that exposes all possible vulnerabilities in the application. Security solutions include input validation, database layer abstraction, server configuration, proxies, web application firewalls, data encryption, and operating system hardening. The steps are as follows:
(1) attack surface evaluation, where the application is decomposed and its entry points are reviewed from an attacker's perspective; (2) threat identification, where each entry point is reviewed against potential threats; (3) impact analysis, where the impact of the potential threat is calculated in terms of risk; and (4) control recommendations, where security controls are recommended to meet security objectives.
A. DATA FLOW DIAGRAM
The information collected, such as external entities, entry points, assets, and trust levels, improves the accuracy of the application model when using a data flow diagram (DFD). The DFD helps to explain how data flows through the application and what happens to the data as it flows. Starting with a higher level DFD, then continuing to create a lower-level DFD, we decompose the application into different processes and their lower-level subprocesses or functions. The higherlevel DFD helps with analysis of the overall scope of the application, while the lower-level DFD illustrates the operation of specific lower-level processes.
Once a DFD is created at the lowest level, we identify all external dependencies, entry points, and trust levels in the application. This aids in quickly determining what data need to be provided to a particular process in the DFD and what the corresponding attacker is targeting to exploit the capabilities of that specific process. This target is used in the DFD to determine the threat path in the application. We identify all possible attackers' targets and vulnerabilities that attackers use to achieve their goals. In this study, the architecture overview of the use case is established using the Microsoft Threat Modeling tool [36] for DFD analysis of the architecture, as shown in Figure 3 .
B. ABUSE CASE MODELING
For our abuse cases, we divided the test into two parts: the security weakness of the target and the possibility of data disclosure. In this study, we use a penetration test. However, a third-party API test can seriously affect legal security issues; therefore, we will only carry out security verification on the IoT devices and the related applications of the selfdeveloped platform used by users, as shown in Table 1 . If the device transmits with Wi-Fi and the TCP/IP Protocol is adopted, we use Nmap for active scanning detection. During device operation, Wireshark is used to collect and analyze the transmitted data packets of the device on the network. If the device transmits with Bluetooth, we use either Host Controller Interface (HCI) packets through an Android or a Bluetooth sniffer to collect broadcast packets. The test methods are described in this section.
1) AIRBOX
We ensure that there is no risk of information disclosure or vulnerability to the device in the usage scenarios employed in this study, as shown in Figure 4 . Based on the abuse model, we use Wireshark, Nmap, and RouterSploit to examine the device.
Wireshark is a tool that can be used to capture data in the network. It can display and interpret captured data in a single-packet format (frame, datagram, packet, and segment) under many network protocol scenarios. Figure 5 illustrates that the tool is typically used to (a) find the root cause of a known problem, (b) search between devices for a particular protocol or data stream, and (c) analyze a particular sequence or protocol flag for each packet.
The main function of Nmap is to scan TCP/IP ports, to discover both to the open port of the target host and the corresponding network service type, application software name, and version. Figure 6 illustrates that Nmap can detect system packet information for the target host. Nmap provides a variety of scanning methods that meet the needs of TCP/IP detection for the deep-penetration test. Zenmap is a GUI version of Nmap that uses Nmap's core when performing scans but has a more user-friendly graphical interface. RouterSploit is an open-source development framework that facilitates the testing of vulnerabilities in embedded devices. As shown in Figure 7 , it provides several modules that help with the penetration testing process: (a) Vulnerability, to exploit known vulnerabilities in the past, (b) Creds, which assists with network service credentials, (c) Scanner, to scan the target for possible attacks, (d) Payload, to generate payloads for injection points, and (e) Generics, to perform generic attacks.
After testing these tools, we found that the IoT device did not disclose any confidential information. In the network transport layer, it has an encrypted transport protocol using HTTPS, so there is no need to worry about eavesdropping during the transmission.ãĂĂDuring a man-inthe-middle (MITM) attack, eavesdropping will not happen because it is impossible to install forged credentials on the device. Although the device has an open listening service section, it does not open unnecessary ports for Telnet or SSH. Therefore, the device does not suffer from the possibility of brute force cracking by remote login.
2) WEARABLE DEVICE
Many of the IoT devices make extensive use of Bluetooth for communication to achieve not only low power but also low latency and cost. These scenarios include IoT applications for medical data, smart homes, personal health monitoring devices, and others. In the Bluetooth environment, not only can a device support multiple transmission modes, but the current development of the Bluetooth standard is open and license-free, making it easier to adopt existing Bluetooth technologies. This phase of the test method, shown in Figure 8 , is primarily aimed at wearable devices transmitted by Bluetooth. Ubertooth One [37] is used to scan the target device and collect Bluetooth protocol packets to enable deep analysis and discussion of protocol weaknesses experienced in the past. Ubertooth One is a 2.4GHz transceiver built for Bluetooth monitoring and traffic injection. Ubertooth One was developed as an open-source project to provide Bluetooth security analysis for anyone. As shown in Figure 9 , the project includes hardware specifications, software, and firmware that make Ubertooth One an effective Bluetooth sniffer, allowing it to sniff data over a base-rate Bluetooth communication connection automatically. With Android 4.4 or later, we can actively collect Bluetooth HCI logs. These logs capture the part of the HCI package that contains Bluetooth communication. For most Android devices, the log is stored in a file named ''btsnoop_hci.log.'' To record all data, the user needs to enable Bluetooth HCI logging through the Developer option, which allows Bluetooth HCI snoop to capture all HCI packages in the file during communication between the IoT device and the Android device. One example is a wearable device that synchronizes data and triggers vibrations, as shown in Figures 10 and 11 .
Although the process of collecting packets by Ubertooth One and HCI Log did not reveal any privacy breaches, this test demonstrated a capability for sensitive data and communication security detection when applied to commercial products. The use of Bluetooth's low-power wireless transmission technology in the medical environment will be a significant trend in the future of personal health information and medical services, but confidential patient data must be kept secure and private, accessible only by authorized personnel. To ensure the privacy of messages and provide the confidentiality and integrity of information security for medical data, the device requires additional computing power for encryption of the transmission process and associated data.
3) MOBILE APPLICATION
Burp Suite is based on an HTTP proxy used by a web browser. With HTTPS-the secure HTTP protocol that uses SSL-Burp Suite can implement an MITM attack to intercept the HTTP message in plaintext, as shown in Figure 12 . The Client obtains a public key certificate from the Server, using an asymmetric cryptography algorithm to negotiate the symmetric key and ensure confidentiality and protection of HTTP messages. SSL is designed to withstand an MITM attack, so HTTPS proxies cannot be implemented through a traditional MITM attack. The purpose of Burp Suite is to disguise itself as the target HTTPS server and convince the client that Burp Suite is the target site. To achieve this, Burp Suite generates a pair of public and private keys, and then binds and encapsulates the public key and target domain name in a certificate. The certificate is verified by convincing the browser of its authenticity. Burp Suite adds a root certificate to the operating system that allows the client to trust all Burp Suite certificates. Burp Suite then has two sets of VOLUME 7, 2019 symmetric keys, one for interacting with the client and one for communicating with the server, where it can obtain the HTTPS plaintext.
In earlier versions of Android, by default, the application trusts not only the system with the Certificate Authority (CA) certificate installed but also the user where the CA certificate has been added. Thus, using an MITM proxy such as Burp Suite, the user can install a fake certificate on the device and then intercept and observe network traffic in plaintext. To prevent an MITM attack, the system can adopt the Certificate-Pinning security mechanism, which prevents attackers from using an MITM attack. Starting with Android 7.0 (API level 24), a new feature allows adding security settings to App resources to prevent an MITM attack; earlier versions of Android require the use of credential binding to prevent an MITM attack. As a result, intercepting application traffic with proxies is harder to implement. The App cannot use an untrusted credential to connect back to the central server, as shown in Figure 13 . 
4) WEB APPLICATION
In the usage scenario architecture analyzed in this study, one component of the web application is responsible for querying personal health data and environmental quality information for the client. We will use penetration testing methods such as automatic scanning tools and manual packet analysis to find possible attack injection points in the web application, as shown in Figure 14 .
OWASP ZAP [38] is an open-source project of the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) under the category of web vulnerability security scanning and local agent tools. It is a set of multi-functional evaluation tools developed for web systems that performs active scanning, violent searching, and automatic crawling of web pages.
OWASP ZAP's local proxy can be used to intercept, snoop, and tamper with client requests and responses, enabling the user to test or attack web application security vulnerabilities under multiple test scenarios.
Another tool is Sqlmap, an open-source penetration testing tool that automatically detects and exploits SQL injection vulnerabilities and servers accessing the database. It has a powerful detection engine and attack injection syntax with multiple databases and can both extract fingerprint identification information from the database and execute SQL commands to access compromised data or control the database. As shown in Figure 15 , the results from scanning using OWASP ZAP uncovered web pages that have both moderateand low-level risks for the following web vulnerabilities: (1) X-Frame-Option Header Not Set, which is used to indicate whether a website can load an iframe element, ensuring its content is not maliciously-embedded in the site and preventing click-hijacking attacks, (2) Cookie Without Secure Flag, which makes cookies available only over HTTPS, and (3) X-Content-Type-Options Header Missing, which prevents content-type from being tampered with maliciously. To address these vulnerabilities, we add security settings to the back-end web server. Figure 16 illustrates that the penetration test portion of Sqlmap uses many parameter injection points and can be used by the client in the attacker's mind but fails to obtain the access right to the database. Accordingly, it is recommended that a relevant protection mechanism is used: either a web application firewall (WAF) or input verification.
V. RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
The source of risk is the focus of system safety protection. Several studies have proposed effective information security evaluation methods. Factors affecting system information security policy include the following:
(1) Assets: identify assets and value;
(2) Threats: exploit the vulnerability of an asset to harm it;
(3) Vulnerabilities: system weaknesses that can be exploited and lead to unexpected results; and (4) Impact probability: the probability of each vulnerability to result in damage caused by threat exploitation. Establishing a complete information security policy is difficult. In addition to the security and reliability requirements of the information infrastructure, issues of data and human risks, such as data errors and equipment abuse, must be considered. We can adhere to relevant international information security standards to improve policy, such as [40] , and NIST SP 800-30 [41] .
Quantitative risk analysis, qualitative risk analysis, or a combination of the two, can be used to assess and prioritize risk. Quantitative risk analysis is used to calculate the probability of event occurrence, possible loss, and historical data for statistics and reference. Qualitative risk analysis is used to observe the occurrence of risks according to the judgment, intuition, and experience of managers, and to analyze these risks based on probabilities, the severity of threats, and the sensitivity of assets. Qualitative risk analysis uses rigorous procedures to assess the value of assets and the likelihood of threats, and then classifies risks by the knowledge and experience of experts, such as high, medium, and low.
As this research framework is a new system without previous data, we use the DREAD and STRIDE models for risk assessment using the qualitative analysis method.
A. DREAD MODEL
The DREAD model represents Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, and Discoverability, as shown in Table 2 . It is used to calculate the risk of each threat to the application, as shown in Table 3 . Severity levels are assigned to threats to enable the identification of threat mitigations by severity. In the definition of a comprehensive score of severity level, Low ranges from 5 to 7, Medium ranges from 8 to 11, and High ranges from 12 to 15.
B. STRIDE MODEL
To identify threats, we need to broadly classify them into the categories shown in Table 4 . This threat classification provides a structured way to identify application threats. The threat identification process uses the STRIDE model to classify threats and examine aspects of application security. The STRIDE model classifies application threats according to the target and purpose of the attack, thus helping developers develop security policies. It also includes countermeasures against all threat categories.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this study, we provide a more complete information security risk analysis process. We first present use cases through a DFD to evaluate the system and workflows on the attack surface area. Then, we use an abuse model to identify several possible attack paths. To further identify potential future threats and preventive measures, we use the DREAD and STRIDE models as guidelines. Based on the test results in this study-for third-party IoT devices, a mobile application, and a self-developed data center management platform-we find no serious information disclosures across entry points. With the development of intelligent IoT applications, big data, and artificial intelligence, IoT devices are used in diverse fields. With many applications come many potential threats and risks. We need to be careful not to compromise personal health data on wearable devices, mobile apps, data center platforms, third-party systems, and other platforms.
IoT information security testing and risk assessment have become important components of the development of international standards such as Considerations for Managing IoT Cybersecurity and Privacy Risks (NISTIR 8228) [42] and IoT Security Guidelines Overview Document (GSMA) [43] . Other well-known international standards such as Information Technology Security Techniques Guidelines for Security and Privacy in the Internet of Things (ISO/IEC WD 27030) [44] are still under development. In future work, we will reference international standards to carry out more accurate verification and audit steps to establish a superior security protection mechanism.
